

ON CHINA'S TRANSITION TO A SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION PHASE UNDER MAO ZEDONG

Toshmatov Shohijahon Abduvohidjon o'g'li
"Magnit Korean School"
Tarix fani o'qituvchisi va menejeri

Abstract

This article analyzes the processes of transition of the People's Republic of China to the stage of socialist construction under Mao Zedong. In particular, domestic political struggles, abandonment of the "new democratic" path, radical turns in the socio-political direction of the Chinese Communist Party and constitutional reforms are covered. The study examines the impact of these processes on Chinese society and the public administration system from a scientific perspective.

Keywords: Mao Zedong, China, socialist construction, political struggle, new democracy, constitution.

Introduction

In the middle of the 20th century, the People's Republic of China experienced a period of radical turning point in the international and domestic political arena. With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the country quickly sought to establish political centralization, economic stability, and social order. In particular, Mao Zedong's consolidation of his position within the party and the political decisions made under his leadership laid the foundation for the country's path to deviate from the "new-democratic" concept towards the post-stage - socialist construction. This transition was associated not only with power disputes within the party, but also with large-scale economic reforms, administrative and economic transformations, and revisions of constitutional mechanisms.

The central events of this period were the land reforms, industrial nationalization and the beginning of the first draft five-year plan for 1953-1957, as well as the elections of 1953-1954 and the drafting of the 1954 Constitution. In particular, elections and the establishment of representative bodies in 1953-1954 marked the process of transition from military-administrative control to a civilian representation system, thereby serving the legalization of the new political regime.

In the scientific literature, this period is analyzed from several directions. Some researchers explain this transition through party centralization and the ideological superiority of Mao's leadership, linking it to the need for social and economic modernization. Others point to the Soviet model and the movement of social strata in the people as the main factor, that is, as a result of the interaction of external (Soviet) aid and internal political discussions, changes have



occurred. However, some studies have explored the electoral and constitutional processes not only in terms of formal institutions, but also in terms of the ruling party's role in strengthening new governance mechanisms and adapting the community to the new order.

METHODS

Historical-analytical and comparative methods were used in the study. The main sources are the early constitutional documents of the People's Republic of China, the works of Mao Zedong, scientific literature and archival materials on modern historiography. Also, the similarities and differences of China's experience with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were studied through a specific method.

RESULTS

The victory of Mao Zedong in the internal party struggle, the abandonment of the country's "new democratic" direction, and the change in the social direction of the ruling party naturally meant the beginning of a new era in the history of the People's Republic of China. The emergence of this political turn undoubtedly coincided with the radical changes in the state structure of the XXR.

In February 1953, the National Assembly of People's Representatives (IMFR), on the initiative of the Central Committee, passed a law on the election of representative bodies at all levels. Elections under this Act were organized in a general, multi-tiered but unequal manner. Urban residents elected representatives from their constituencies in a ratio almost eight times smaller, which broke parity with rural residents.

The election campaign began in the spring of 1953 with preparatory work, including the first nationwide census in Chinese history. In May 1954, elections to lower-level authorities (at the level of uyezd, posyolka and volost) were concluded, which were held by open suffrage at voters' meetings. Sessions of the Lower Level People's Representatives were held in June–July 1954. They, in turn, elected deputies to the people's representatives meetings at the provincial level. Then, in July 1954, these bodies elected deputies to the All-China People's Congress (CNC) by secret ballot. Thus, during the "election year", representative bodies at all levels gradually replaced military-control structures. Uzavtosanoat to be transformed¹

On September 15, 1954, the first session of the BXVY was opened in Beijing, and on September 20, the Constitution of the PRC was unanimously adopted. This seemed to have completed the formation of the new Chinese state system. Article 1 of the Constitution defined the XXR as a state of people's democracy, led by the working class, based on the union of workers and peasants. The preface to the text included the general political direction of the party, announced by the leadership of the CPC last year. Article 4 stated that "the People's Republic of China will gradually destroy the system of exploitation and build a socialist society

¹ Mao Zedong. Speech at the II Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of the Eighth Convocation // Selected Works. – Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1977. T. 5. – P. 398-419.



through socialist industrialization and socialist restructuring, relying on state organs and public forces."²

While the National Political Advisory Committee's (MSMQ) 'General Program' guarantees are given to private property, the new Constitution declared public property "sacred and inviolable". The Constitution guaranteed not only political rights, but also the socio-economic rights of citizens (for example, the right to work). In addition, the right to form national autonomous provinces, districts, or districts was recognized for representatives of non-Chinese nationalities.

The adoption of the Constitution required significant changes in the structure of the country's state bodies. Mao Zedong was elected to the post of Chairman of the People's Republic of China, introduced by the Constitution. Liu Shaoqi was appointed Chairman of the Standing Committee of the BXVY and acting supreme authority between sessions. And the government, the State Council, continued its activities again under the leadership of Zhou Enlai. Now, the MSMQ has temporarily ceased to perform the functions of a supreme representative body and has retained its status as an advisory body as an organizational structure of the united front. However, these "constitutional" innovations did not change the totalitarian essence of the state apparatus, power remained entirely in the hands of the leadership of the CPC.³

The socio-political turn initiated by the leadership of the CPSU in 1953 was reflected not only in the Constitution, but also in the final formation of the first five-year plan of the national economy. Work on the plan began as early as 1951, but internal partisan struggles, social uncertainties and the Korean War caused the plan's authors to refrain from hasty decisions. Chinese economists, in addition to the existing economic experience, naturally made extensive use of the Soviet experience in drawing up the plan. The plan was completed in early 1955, and the first five-year program for 1953–1957 became an expression of the party's direction towards the industrialization and socialist restructuring of the country.

This plan provided for the construction of 694 large power plants, metallurgical combinats, machine-building plants and mainly heavy industrial enterprises. As a result of the commissioning of new enterprises and the reconstruction of old ones, it is planned that the gross product of the industry will double at the end of the five-year period, while the average wages of workers and employees will rise by a third. It is planned to cover 33% of peasant farms by the end of the five years through the development of cooperative movement in rural areas, as well as attract about 2 million artisans to the cooperative.⁴ At the same time, it was determined that most of the private-capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises would be incorporated into various forms of state-capitalism.

² Mao Zedong. On the Ten Most Important Relationships // Selected Works. – Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1977. T. 5. – P. 339-368.

³ Mao Zedong. On the Coalition Government // Selected Works. – Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1969. T. 3. – P. 259-350.

⁴ Popov A.P. Political Systems and Political Regimes in China of the XX Century. Moscow, Ekzamen Publ., 2007. – 184 p.



DISCUSSION

On March 31, 1955, the first draft five-year plan was discussed and approved at the All-China Conference of the Communist Party of China (CPC). On July 30, 1955, the draft was submitted to the Second Session for approval by the All-China People's Representative Assembly (CIS). This arrangement indicated the historical significance of the plan at the level of law passed by the highest state body.

Just like the party's "headline," the five-year plan was the product of a compromise between the two currents in the CPI's leadership, the moderate-pragmatic and radical-utopian wings. The productive and socio-economic directions outlined in the plan were largely rational and moderate, with the aim of ensuring that the gradual implementation of the reforms would ensure a minimum painful transition for all segments of society. However, the real possibilities of such a political compromise could only be determined in the process of practical implementation of the program of socio-economic change.

The possibility of rapid modernization of the Chinese national economy was largely due to the significant economic, scientific and technical assistance of the Soviet Union during this period. N.S. Khrushchev, who came to power after the death of I.V. Stalin, set aside the previous distrust of the Chinese leadership and chose the path of comprehensive support for socialist changes in China. It was in 1953-1955 that the highest level of ideological-political rapprochement was observed between the leaders of the CPSU and the CPSU, and the USSR provided the greatest economic and technical assistance to China.⁵

In 1953-1954, contracts for construction and reconstruction of 156 large industrial facilities and agreements on concessional loans were signed. In 1954, the Soviet government freely handed over to the Chinese side the projects of more than 1,400 industrial enterprises and the collection of more than 24,000 scientific and technical documents. Thousands of Chinese students were sent to study in the USSR, thousands of specialists underwent internships. At the same time, hundreds of qualified Soviet specialists worked as consultants in various fields of China. This scale of assistance is unprecedented in history. Also, "people's democracy countries" in Eastern Europe have helped build more than 100 enterprises in China.

During 1955–1957, the tasks of the first five-year plan were fulfilled and even more fulfilled. In 1957, industrial production increased by 141 percent compared to 1952. Heavy industry, especially the machinery industry, developed intensively: the country began to provide by its own power 60% of its needs for machinery and equipment. The production of metallurgy increased significantly, new industries appeared, such as the production of automobiles, tractors, aircraft. The military industry has also risen to the modern level. From this point of view, the economic part of the five-year plan was successfully implemented and confirmed the correctness of the economic strategy chosen by the CPI.

However, in the implementation of social change, an entirely different situation has emerged. After the approval of the plan, a sharp struggle began among the CPI leaders over the pace and forms of socialist change. It was, in fact, a clash of the two main ideological strands that existed within the party – the moderate-pragmatic and the radical-utopian views. In the process, the

⁵ Portyakov V.Y. Economic Policy of China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping. Moscow, Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 1998. – 134 p.



worship of Mao Zedong's personality, his ideological and political pretensions, became more and more intense.⁶

After his victory in 1953, Mao began to take drastic measures against his opponents within the party. The first target was Gao Gan, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who headed the Manchurian Party organization for many years and had close ties to the leaders of the CPSU. He accused him, as well as CPC Central Committee member Zhao Shushi, of violating party unity. In February 1954, at the IV Plenum of the CPC of the CPI, this "Gao Gan – Zhao Shushi case" was considered. Although they were officially warned, Gao Gan was later arrested and died in prison.

In March 1955, Mao raised the issue again at the CPSU All-China Conference, and based on Deng Xiaopi's lecture, the conference officially condemned Gao Gan and supported Mao's path. This incident led to the justification of political and physical repression and set a dangerous precedent in the party. Subsequently, such political repressions, ideological campaigns (for example, attacks on the intelligentsia, the fight against "counter-revolutionaries") intensified, and tens of thousands of people were punished throughout the country.⁷

Thus, during the implementation period of the first five-year plan, along with the positive results of economic development, political struggles and the intensification of repressive measures towards the consolidation of Mao Zedong's personal power had complex consequences in Chinese society.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be said that although China's process of transition to socialist construction was initially interpreted as a major political victory, its social and economic consequences were complex and contradictory. The acceleration of the process of cooperatives gave impetus to socialist changes in the cities as well, however, as a result of the application of coercive measures in agriculture and the making of unfulfilled promises, discontent among the people intensified and social contradictions deepened. This, along with the achievements of socialist construction, exposed its internal problems and the danger of crisis.

REFERENCES

1. Mao Zedong. Speech at the II Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of the Eighth Convocation // Selected Works. – Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1977. T. 5. – P. 398-419.
2. Mao Zedong. On the Ten Most Important Relationships // Selected Works. – Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1977. T. 5. – P. 339-368.
3. Mao Zedong. On the Coalition Government // Selected Works. – Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1969. T. 3. – P. 259-350.

⁶ Usov V.N. PRC: from the "Great Leap Forward" to the "Cultural Revolution". Moscow, IFES RAN Publ., 1998. – 245 p.

⁷ Levy M. Modernization and the Structure of Societies. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. – 156 p.



4. Pivovarova E.P. Construction of socialism with the specifics of China: Search for the way. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1992. – 156 p.
5. Popov A.P. Political Systems and Political Regimes in China of the XX Century. Moscow, Ekzamen Publ., 2007. – 184 p.
6. Portyakov V.Y. Economic policy of China in the era of Deng Xiaoping. Moscow, Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 1998. – 134 p.
7. Smirnov D.A. Ideological and political aspects of the modernization of the PRC: from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. Moscow, IFES RAN Publ., 2005. – 165 p.
8. Usov V.N. PRC: from the "big leap" to the "cultural revolution". Moscow, IFES RAN Publ., 1998. – 245 p.
9. Usov V.N. PRC: from "cultural revolution" to reforms and openness. Moscow, IFES RAN Publ., 2003. – 216 p.
10. Titarenko M.L. Modernization of China: Chances and Challenges of Time. Moscow, IFES RAN Publ., 2000. – 47 p.
11. Levy M. Modernization and the Structure of Societies. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. – 156 p.
12. Mac Gowan J. Light and Shadows of Chinese Life. – Shanghai, 1999. – 142 p.